Follow-up to the Dutch Safety Board’s recommendations
The Dutch Safety Board published a report on Schiphol’s aviation safety in April 2017. In this report, recommendations were made in order to address the identified safety issues.
The ISMS sector partners work together to follow-up on the Dutch Safety Board’s recommendations. The Schiphol Safety Improvement Roadmap contains, but is not limited to, the studies and measures which are necessary to implement the Safety Board recommendations. Depending on the results of the studies and outcomes of ISMS investigations, new additional measures that contribute to the follow-up of the Dutch Safety Board’s recommendations will be added to the roadmap.
In March 2020, Kwink Groep and To70 were commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W) to evaluate the implementation of the Dutch Safety Board’s recommendations based on their review of air safety at Schiphol.
Among the conclusions of this evaluation, they stated: “It can reasonably be expected that the measures that have been implemented and planned will effectively reduce the safety risks reported by the Dutch Safety Board (recommendations 1 to 3). Moreover, with the introduction of the ISMS there is now a process to effectively reduce these and any new safety risks.”
In February 2022, To70 and Stratagem Consulting performed a second evaluation of the Dutch Safety Board’s recommendations, commissioned by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W). tweede-evaluatie-implementatie-ovv-aanbevelingen.pdf
Among the conclusions of this evaluation, it is stated that “In 2021 we concluded that since 2019, a huge progress has been made, and the majority of these measures are completed and implemented in the organisational policy of the sector parties and the government.
At the end of 2025, the third evaluation was started on behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (I&W)
Reducing the number of runway incursions
The Dutch Safety Board recommended to structurally reduce the number of runway incursions.
The Runway Safety Team (RST) is a team of experts who identify ways to reduce the number of runway incursions. Trends are continuously monitored to identify locations at the airport where runway incursions take place or have taken place in the past in order to prevent these situations from re-occurring in the future. This resulted in several ongoing studies and implementation projects, such as an improved procedure for crossing the Aalsmeerbaan runway, whereby runway incursions are prevented.
In the ISMS structure, there is an executive chairman of the RST. That shifts the group’s status from an advisory panel into an action-focused group. They will develop a plan to structurally reduce risks involved with runway incursions, which will include objectives and measures on how to reduce them.
Compared to 2017, the overall total of runway incursions reduced significantly.
Here is an overview of the number of Runway Incursions at Schiphol airport in the years that followed
| Year | Cat B | Cat C | Cat D | Total |
| 2017 | 1 | 7 | 38 | 46 |
| 2018 | 1 | 1 | 28 | 30 |
| 2019 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 |
| 2020 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 25 |
| 2021 | 0 | 2 | 22 | 24 |
| 2022 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 20 |
| 2023 | 0 | 1 | 18 | 19 |
| 2024 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 14 |
| 2025 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 14 |
Note: A more serious Cat A incident did not occur at all in this period.
| Severity Class | Description |
| Cat A | A serious incident in which a collision is narrowly avoided. |
| Cat B | An incident in which separation decreases and there is significant potential for collision, which may result in a time-critical corrective / evasive response to avoid a collision. |
| Cat C | An incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to avoid a collision. |
| Cat D | An incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as the incorrect presence of a single vehicle, person or aircraft on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but with no immediate safety consequence. |
| Cat E | Insufficient information or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes a severity assessment |





